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PACIFISM AS AN OFFSPRING OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Modern pacifism is a by-product of social democracy. It originated in the extreme left wing of the French Revolution. Its first representatives are found among those men of terror and blood who made themselves known and abhorred throughout the world as "Jacobins." The revolution was, at its inception, a revolt against the absolute monarchy in France only. It was not until this monarchy had been completely overthrown that it took the form of a declaration against practically all the other governments of Europe. The classic argument of kings, the bayonet, failed Louis XVI when the army stood aloof or made common cause with the revolution and then dissolved into an undisciplined rabble. On the other hand, as the national guards were being organized in large numbers, the better informed leaders began to feel secure against a return of despotism from within. As long as France did not quarrel with her neighbours her enthusiasts appeared justified in painting her future in the rosiest colours.

But just here was the difficulty. Was it possible for France to remain at peace with her unregenerate neighbours? If not, her disorganized condition exposed her to the peril of subjugation and the destruction of the liberty she had just gained with so much labour and misgiving. Men with some military knowledge understood well enough that the national guards could not, without further discipline and training, be relied on for defence against a foreign enemy. But they found it almost impossible to obtain a hearing. Fear of a military despotism had already established the cult of anti-militarism. The national guards themselves soon fell under suspicion. It was felt that they must not be made too efficient. No *esprit de corps* was to be tolerated among them; their uniform was not to be worn outside the hour of actual service. Lafayette, commandant of the guards of Paris, struggling to introduce some kind of discipline, was denounced as a traitor preparing for a military dictatorship, and everything was done to encourage insubordination. The guardsman was not to be a machine compelled to obey without question. He was to be

free to decide for himself whether or not his orders were legal or "patriotic."

It was evident, then, that the revolution must make friends abroad in order to escape the necessity of maintaining a large and disciplined army at home. The matter became acute in the spring of 1790. England and Spain had become involved in a violent dispute over conflicting claims in the Nootka Sound region. War appeared imminent and Spain expected aid from France in virtue of a "Family Compact" entered into in 1762. When the subject was brought before the National Assembly on May 14th, a cry at once arose that the whole affair rested upon a ministerial intrigue directed from the Court of France through its ambassador at Madrid. The Jacobin Club held an extraordinary session in the evening and all its leaders attacked the ministry, which, they said, desired war with England in order to withdraw attention from the revolution at home. They opposed the government's request for the small credit needed to arm fourteen ships of the line, a precautionary measure deemed wise in view of the spectacular preparations England was making. Having lost this point, they next sought a decree which should lodge the power of declaring war and making peace in the national assembly. But they were out-manœuvred and forced to accept a compromise, leaving the initiative with the king and only the power of sanction or revision with the assembly. This decree was denounced by the whole Jacobin wing of the revolution as the work of a ministerial clique bent upon war. One concession, however, the defeated party had gained. It had induced the assembly to incorporate in the decree an article containing a solemn proclamation to the world renouncing all desire of conquest and pledging France never to engage in offensive wars.

This was on May 22d. Toward the close of June it became known that the government had received from Spain the anticipated request for aid. The Jacobins, the peace advocates of the day, were now confronted with the necessity either of discussing the merits of the case or of openly repudiating the obligations of France contracted under the old or absolute monarchy. Without hesitation they chose the latter alternative. The Marquis of Girardin laid before the society a general statement which may be accepted as fairly representative of the Jacobin view, since it was printed and distributed in the name of the society.

What should the national assembly say to Spain in reply to

her request for aid? asked the Marquis. How was it possible to make any intelligent reply whatever without the exact knowledge the ministry alone possessed? Certainly the assembly could never hope to extract the truth from such a source. It would be folly to attempt to "penetrate the tortuous labyrinth of the politics of courts," for in this field of intrigue the ministers were past masters. The assembly would only besmirch itself by going into the question of fact at all. Aside from all this there could be no thought of war because of the exhausted condition of the country.

"In this day of our destinies," he continued, "it is not to Spain alone that France must reply, but to all peoples, and at this moment, above all, to the English people; they have given us a full assurance of peace, they are watching us, they await our reply. Let it be equivocal in ever so slight a degree and the whole ministerial league will immediately seize upon it to make war upon us. If on the contrary our reply bears the grand character of frankness and loyalty, every pretext will be wanting. The English people are convinced that they ought to esteem us, to regard us as compeers in liberty, and to sustain us even against their own ministers who are everywhere alike the enemies of all liberties."

There was, then, only one reply worthy of inspiring universal confidence and consistent with the principles of the revolution, namely, the decree of the national assembly not to wage offensive wars.

"It is this decree, so just, so wise, so magnanimous, which must at this moment be, in the name of the French people, solemnly proclaimed and authentically notified to all peoples. This striking act of the national word of honour will alone suffice as the tie of civil confraternity among all men, and at the same time become the sacred ægis of the constitution, of liberty, of peace, and of the glory of France."

The Marquis closed his speech with a piece of sheer bombast, which we quote because it truthfully reflects the Jacobin spirit of the time.

"What became," he said, "of the innumerable multitude of the slaves of Xerxes before a small number of free men? The whole of Europe is not in condition to attack a free France at her hearthstone, a people of brothers under a paternal royalty and holding out a pacific hand toward all men. If any despots, in defiance of the sacred laws of eternal justice, should dare, like brigands, to come and attack us at home, they will gain nothing, except to see their slaves free themselves and unite themselves to liberty."

The Jacobins were mistaken in regard to the temper of the English people as a whole. They were in possession of some

evidence that a portion of the English, the opposition minority, were well disposed toward the French. They had been for some time in correspondence with a "Society of the Revolution" in London which held a position in England similar, in some respects, to that of the Jacobins in France. The London society contained a number of influential men, among them Lord Stanhope. It was anti-ministerial and stood at the head of a national propaganda whose ostensible object was to disseminate the ideas of the English revolution of 1688. Like the Jacobins it had branch or affiliated societies outside the capital. In November, 1789, it had sent a letter of felicitation to the national assembly at Paris which served as evidence of a desire for fraternization. The intercourse between these French and English societies was of a very cordial nature. When a Jacobin went to London he was received with open arms by the society and the same friendship was shown the Londoner when he visited any of the Jacobin societies whether in Paris or in the provinces. While the Spanish-English dispute was in progress, members of the London society crossed the channel into Brittany, called upon the local societies and were banqueted by them. At Nantes toasts were drunk to "Lord Stanhope," "The Honourable Members of the Society at London," and "The English People." The society at Cherbourg exchanged fraternal letters with their friends in England, in which the idea of war between the two countries was deprecated. The Jacobins at Nantes were not satisfied with having fêted their visitors. They commissioned their president to go to London to present the society there with the flag used at their banquet as "an emblem of fraternity." Later in the year commissioners were sent out from London to visit all the Jacobin societies of France, of which there were now several hundred, and affiliate them.

This friendly intercourse across the English Channel is now an obscure matter. Little or no trace of it is to be found in the histories of the period. But at the time it attracted considerable attention, for references to it are found not only in a number of prominent journals of Paris but also in those of the provinces.

England and Spain finally adjusted their differences and the war clouds in this quarter of the international horizon dissolved. Lord Acton says that thanks to the pacific attitude of France, Pitt, one of the "enemies of all liberties," scored a diplomatic victory against the ally of her traditional foe. But now the rulers

of Europe were becoming uneasy at the news arriving from the great capital on the Seine. The absolute monarchy, overthrown in France, was about to throw down the gauntlet to the revolution which was becoming ever more aggressive. The answer of the revolution was the proclamation of the brotherhood of man and a declaration of war upon man's enemies, his rulers. But it was to be a war without bloodshed. The thesis of the Marquis of Girardin that not even the mercenaries of tyranny would, when enlightened, fight a free people who offered them liberty instead of bullets, was now taken up in earnest. France was deemed entirely safe if only she could make her neighbours understand her fraternal sentiments. As an open propaganda on foreign soil was out of the question, the printing press was naturally the first thing to be thought of. To escape the censor a resourceful person suggested in all seriousness that a corps of balloonists might cross the frontiers and drop the *Rights of Man*, pamphlets, and newspapers broadcast from the skies, a free gift directly to the people. A Prussian observer, Konrad Oelsner, who was then in Paris, thought this might be effective with any other nation, but that "German soldiers and Pandours can be taught sense and humanity only through whipping. They are machines without souls, designed solely for murder." Another thought that a troop of tyrannicides might lessen the danger of war by killing some of the tyrants. It was believed that after a few had been assassinated the rest would lose courage and keep the peace.

A more practical way was officially adopted by the Jacobins in June, 1791. The emigrants, gathered on the frontiers of France, now threatened to make trouble for the country they had abandoned. The Jacobins, therefore, drew up an address in the name of all the Jacobin societies of France, in which they made a direct appeal to the people of the neighbouring countries. The latter were asked to drive out the emigrants who were plotting against France. They were assured that the decree of the national assembly ordering the emigrants to return was not intended as a threat against the people who harboured them.

"Brothers and Friends," they said, "it is they alone [the emigrants] whom we menace with just punishments if they persevere in their hostile designs. To you we announce peace, confidence, union, fraternity. Englishmen, Belgians, Germans, Piedmontese, Spaniards, soldiers of every people, the French and you henceforth constitute but a single people, a single family whose disunion is no longer possible."

This address was translated into the languages of the various peoples for whom it was designed and distributed to the affiliated societies near the frontiers to be smuggled across, it is to be presumed, as occasion offered.

While the Jacobins thus proclaimed their pacific attitude toward the people of foreign countries they did not aspire to the formal *rôle* of international peacemakers. As one of their journalists, Madame Robert of the *Mercure de France*, said: "They have rendered homage to humanity in preparing the national decree by which, renouncing all spirit of conquest, we swear peace and fraternity to all nations. They do not pretend to the chimerical glory of a pact of the human race; they seek the federative pact of the French." This statement was called forth by the proceedings of a new society which had just been organized, the "Social Circle" or "General Confederation of the Friends of Truth."

In this new organization we have at last a formal peace propaganda. It had chosen for its meeting place the Circus or Riding School of the Palais Royal in Paris, the very heart of the revolution. Its appearance was greeted with enormous enthusiasm. At its first session on October 13, 1790, four to five thousand people attended. At the third session the attendance rose to ten thousand. Its chief founder was the Abbé of Montfort, Claude Fauchet, a polished but shallow orator desperately bent upon attracting attention to himself. In this he succeeded; but no one seemed able to grasp the exact meaning of his numerous speeches, composed of a mixture of Christianity, Freemasonry, and eighteenth-century French philosophy. The practical, matter-of-fact Bailly, mayor of Paris, thought Fauchet would have been better off if he had learned to "go to bed early and to rise late." The general idea back of the society was, however, clear enough, and it is not difficult to discover the germ out of which it grew. Christianity was common to Europe and one of its fundamental conceptions is the brotherhood of man. The same, in a lesser degree, is true of Freemasonry. There is a suggestion in the evidence that the Social Circle contained as its core the débris of a Masonic lodge which had existed in the same locality, and among its founders, besides Fauchet, are mentioned Condorcet, Goupil de Préfeln, Bonneville, Mailly de Château-Regnaud, and several others, all of whom had been or still were Masons. This made it easier for the Social Circle to appeal to

the Masons of other countries and ask them to come to the assistance of the propaganda by emphasizing the fraternal side of their code and by using their influence locally to cause the pacific advances of the revolution to be favourably received.

In its method of procedure the Social Circle followed closely the footsteps of the Jacobins. It adopted an official organ of publicity, which was at the same time to serve as a medium of correspondence. This paper, the *Bouche de Fer* (or *Iron Mouth*), was to receive letters and information from private persons and branch societies, whether in France or elsewhere, and from this material garner the truth for publication. In this way "every system," to use their own expression, was to be reduced to its true or relative value. It was assumed that in the mere knowledge of the truth the world would federate and remain at peace, there being no longer any misunderstandings. An appeal was sent out for all the societies, of whatever nature, to ally themselves with the Social Circle. They seemed on the point of making themselves the headquarters of a huge international propaganda including all the patriotic societies whether moderate or radical. This caused the Jacobins to take alarm for they were not prepared to surrender the leadership they had by this time gained, and they were, moreover, wounded by the arrogant manner in which the editor of the *Bouche de Fer* treated them in his editorials. A violent quarrel ensued and the Social Circle was thus deprived of the co-operation of nearly the whole of the great Jacobin fraternity and of that of the societies following their lead—an eloquent testimony to the futility of world federation. Here were two peace propagandas, next-door neighbours, who almost came to blows over a question of leadership. It was a severe check but it did not prevent the Social Circle from prosecuting its object. It secured some affiliations in France; and societies are mentioned also in England, Ireland, Scotland, Poland, Germany, Holland, and Belgium. Unfortunately the details of the working of this propaganda have not yet been recovered by historians. We get an idea how these foreign affiliations were obtained from the work of Claude Perroud on the correspondence of Madame Roland. Bancal des Issarts, a friend of the Rolands, had gone to London at the close of 1790. Here, in April, 1791, he received a letter from Fauchet asking him to interest the English societies in his undertaking, to establish communication

between them and the Social Circle in order "to conspire for the unity of the human race."

But the Social Circle and the *Bouche de Fer* were already nearing the end of their career. Both went down in the catastrophe of the monarchy, following the flight of the king on June 20, 1791. There was, after all, no room in France for a disinterested internationalism, if such we may call this venture. The initial enthusiasm over, the lofty appeal of the Social Circle fell upon deaf ears or elicited only a derisive response. Few will dissent from the judgment which Prof. Zinkeisen in his picturesque language has laid upon the society.

"It wished to march about in the revolutionary swirl," he says, "mounted on stilts in order not to besmirch itself in the filth of every-day vulgarities, and sought for the solution of the great problems time had brought forth, in the air, whereas it was necessary to seek for it in the depths of human weaknesses."

Although written more than sixty years ago, have not these words still a message for the pacifists of to-day?

Such was, in outline, the attitude of probably the majority of the revolutionists during 1790 and the first half of 1791. That is, outwardly. It is, no doubt, upon such evidence as we have just given that Professor Aulard of the Sorbonne based his sweeping statement in 1904 that

"hardly founded, this new nation [that is, the nation of the revolution] conceived the idea of the federation of all the nations of the world in a single human family in which each national group should preserve its personality. It was then that it was beginning to be said, popularly, that all people are brothers, that they ought to love each other, to aid each other, and not hate and kill each other."

Professor Aulard, social democrat and perpetual advocate of the revolution *in toto*, is necessarily a pacifist who dreams of the "federative pact of the human race" as a guarantee of peace. Strange that so renowned a scholar should never have asked himself whether or not the federation of the world, if it should ever become a reality, would, *ipso facto*, bring about a universal and permanent peace. History, ancient, mediæval, and modern, refutes such an assumption on almost every page. The world as a whole has never been federated, it is true, but there have been many federated states—that is, groups of states bound together by ties such as we must suppose the pacifists to have in

mind. In the Greece of classical times we find a perfect example of this artificial internationalism. In 370 B. C. a number of Arcadian cities established a federal league to take the place of an older system that had grown up naturally during their long wars with Sparta. To create a central point of union they built a new city and called it "Megalopolis," the "Great City." One whole tribe removed to this place and emigrants were introduced from all the cities in the league. A federal legislature was created, a federal revenue, and an army of five thousand hoplites provided for. But this did not bring a better understanding or a more effective resistance to the national enemy. On the contrary, the new city aroused the jealousy of the older ones and within twenty years the "Great City" fell into the hands of the Spartans and became a "Great Desert," as a sarcastic poet said.

Switzerland has always been a confederation of republics, which the pacifists tell us are not warlike, and yet at the time of the reformation and later the cantons fought among themselves. Mexico is a federal state also composed of republics, and is nearly always at war unless held in check by a military dictator. Our own country is a union of republics inhabited by an unmilitary and unarmed population. We do not believe in large armaments and will not submit to military training in time of peace. Can the pacifists hope ever to federate the world as closely as the American states were bound together in 1860? Nevertheless we fought a great war from 1861 to 1865. It was primarily the federated German states that were engaged in the Thirty Years' war which, for destructiveness, downright, wanton brutality, and disregard of every human consideration, has no parallel in modern history. Europe, then living under the shadow of Machiavellism, was admittedly not squeamish, but it rose in horror to protest against such a method of warfare. Even a portion of Ireland, member of the English system, was recently prepared for an appeal to arms.

But Professor Aulard need not have gone so far afield for his examples. He could have found them in his own beloved France even during the very revolution he has spent a busy life to defend. The provinces of France federated during the years 1788 to 1790, holding a great national federation on the *Champs de Mars* of Paris on July 14, 1790. On that day there were many embracings, many great oaths were sworn and many tears shed. It was the "federative pact of the French" of which Madame

Robert spoke a few months later. A few weeks after this great national festival this same Champs de Mars was filled with lamentations over the bodies of the dead national guards fallen at Nancy in battle with Frenchmen and Swiss mercenaries "federated" with the French. In three years more the Red Terror was at death's grip with La Vendée, Brittany, Lyons, and other places; and blood, French blood, the blood of the federated, ran in torrents on the battle field and the guillotine.

The pacifists of the revolution came to grief the moment they obtained full possession of the government. For a time their theories, their beautiful professions, captivated the more impressionable minds of Europe. But the delusion soon vanished in the noise and smoke of battle. The Frenchmen brought peace to their neighbours at the point of the bayonet, and the bayonet was followed by a swarm of hungry politicians who soon cured the "slaves" of despots from any predilection they may have had for international federation. The war, begun in April, 1792, lasted, with only brief intervals of peace, until June, 1815, when the battle of Waterloo put an end to the cataclysmal strife.

The pacifists of to-day have gone a step beyond the revolutionists in their opposition to military establishments. Not only are armaments useless, they say, because the people of the different countries do not wish to fight each other, but also because they provoke war. When they are in the hands of monarchical governments they are the instruments of tyranny. What is needed to assure a permanent universal peace is, first, republican forms of government, and second, disarmament and the suppression of private arms and munition factories. If this argument is valid, how comes it that throughout history the republican states have been, if anything, more warlike than their monarchical contemporaries? The Athenian democracy, the Roman republic, the Italian city states of the Middle Ages, and the Swiss cantons all bear witness to this fact. And during the period of their independent existence have not the United States fought as many wars as, or even more wars than, any of the great military states of Europe? The last body of men the French revolutionists had to conquer before they could finally lay their hands upon Louis XVI was the mercenary guard from republican Switzerland stationed at the Tuileries on August 10, 1792. Great armaments and universal military service in time of peace

are the invention of Prussia and were introduced during the middle of the last century. And were there no wars before that date? As good a social democrat and peace-lover as Charles Seignobos of the Sorbonne has stated in a sober historical work that the great armaments have enormously lessened the danger of war. The Orange Free State and the Boer Republic on the one hand and England on the other, did not have the universal military service or the large standing armies of volunteers. Neither did the United States in 1898. Said the late Professor J. A. Cramb of England: "In the nineteenth century there is a long series of wars—in the Crimea, in India, and Afghanistan, in China, in New Zealand, in Egypt, in Western and in Southern Africa; so that it might be said without exaggeration that through all these years scarcely a sun set which did not look upon some Englishman's face dead in battle." Can the most rabid pacifist bring an indictment like this against that blackest of all iniquities, "Prussian Militarism"?

The pacifists of America, having been convicted of false prophecy, now predict anew that the present war is the great, final catastrophe, the darkness before the millennial dawn. After it is over, they say, general disarmament is certain to take place. To those who feel somewhat uneasy over the comparative unpreparedness of the United States the pacifist replies with his usual facility and assurance:

"Your fear arises from your colossal ignorance and incapacity for sound reasoning. Can you not see that all the great military and naval powers will exhaust themselves utterly in the conflict now going on? Bankrupt in men and money and held in the firm grip of their mutual hatreds, the European nations will not be, for a long time to come, in condition to attack America."

This argument is, no doubt, convincing to a large number of people who are either predisposed to this view or too indifferent to give it serious attention. As a matter of fact a moment's consideration shows the contention to be utterly absurd. For, despite the losses in men, wealth, and munitions of war, the conflict might continue for several years without seriously weakening any of the great powers involved in it. When peace is made all prisoners of war will be restored and there will then be an immensely greater number of trained fighters than at the beginning of the war. The proportion of those killed or badly

maimed is very small and the present war seems to be less destructive of life than most wars have been, numbers considered. Prisoners aside, the great powers will find new men arriving at maturity almost as fast as others are killed or permanently disabled at the front. The margin of difference is so small as to make the reduction in the number of fighting men at the end of the war so inconsiderable as to merit little attention in gauging the fighting strength of the nation. Moreover, no great war of history has ever ended because the supply of able-bodied men had been exhausted. The final reserve strength of the nation, whether in men or munitions of war, is never called in. The contest is decided by the greater momentum or superior position gained by one of the parties to the war. Reserve strength is of no value if it cannot be employed, and it is only in the reserve strength that the belligerent nations are being weakened, strange as that may sound. All the powers involved, with the possible exception of Serbia, can strike a much harder blow to-day than they could when the war began, and any one of them would now be a more dangerous enemy to an unprepared neutral than before a shot was fired or a man killed.

With regard to national hatreds it is only those who are totally blind to the lessons of history who cannot see that wars do more toward allaying than toward creating them. The error is natural to the pacifists who look upon war as a disease, whereas it is at most a symptom, an evidence of disease—a violent proceeding on the part of the body politic to cast out a disturbing element of some kind. This war is not producing national hatreds, and none existed except between England and Germany. To-day, seven months after the war began, German and Englishman are fraternizing in the trenches between the intervals of fighting. The war is creating mutual understanding and respect as each discovers unsuspected virtues in his antagonist. So it has been in the past. Our war with Spain brought to end nearly a century of friction and ill feeling between the two countries. The Boers held a standing grudge against England before the South African war. They are for the most part loyal supporters of England to-day when a war for independence would almost certainly succeed. Thirty or more years of ill feeling preceded our civil war, growing more intense as the moment for the clash drew near. The war, in removing the cause of the strife, has brought, not only good will, but mutual admiration. Dr. Nicholas

Murray Butler has recently declared that this war was a mistake; that the question at issue could have been solved without an appeal to arms, and that, therefore, this conflict between federated states does not militate against the assumption that the federation of the world would bring peace. Most assuredly! And by parity of reasoning we can prove with equal facility that not a single evil need necessarily exist to plague mankind. If man were different it is probable that his history would be different. But unfortunately for the pacifists history does not deal with a hypothetical race. We have to do with hard, positive facts. There is no warrant for reading a potential into the past. The potential in history is merged and lost in the actual—there is no room for a potential which is not realized in the actual. The course of history is the fulfilment of the imperative mandate of evolution; it is the curve traced by the final resultant of all the forces acting upon and through man. It is, therefore, absurd to speak of the civil war as a thing that might have been avoided. If history is to enlighten us we cannot quarrel with her verdict in such fashion. But the confusion of thought in the mind of Dr. Butler is common among pacifists and constitutes one of their fundamental errors. They attack a great historic institution before they have attained to a clear understanding of the only principle according to which historical facts can be assigned a scientific value.

To return to the point, namely, American immunity guaranteed by the war in Europe. Our modern pacifists are not the first to undergo this illusion, for here also the French revolution furnishes us with an exact parallel. On July 10, 1791, Brissot de Warville, the well-informed editor of the *Patriote Français*, delivered a long speech at the Jacobins on the inviolability of Louis XVI, who, some thought, had committed a crime in fleeing from Paris a few weeks before. Among the arguments advanced against punishing the king was the fear that such action would bring on war. Brissot, besides contemptuously rejecting the thought of fear on the part of a free people, held that there was no danger of war because no country was in condition to attack France. He went through the whole list of possible enemies and found none anywhere who was either capable or likely to undertake serious operations. Beginning with England he found her impotent because Ireland was in perpetual rebellion and was imitated by India. The Scotch were emigrating in large numbers,

while an enormous and ever increasing debt left her hardly sufficient resources for holding together her shaking empire. Besides, the mass of Englishmen would hold a war with France in execration. This of the country that formed the backbone of the long struggle of Europe against revolutionary France and the empire of Napoleon which supplanted it!

Holland, he said, was ruled by a

"shameless and imperious woman, an imbecile and despised prince, a states-general of slaves, an odious magisterial aristocracy, two aristocratic factions ready to fly at each other's throats, a seditious *canaille* subject to the orders of the prince, no money, no credit, no ships, no troops, two bankrupt companies [the great chartered Indian companies, no doubt], and a shaken bank,—such is the government of Holland."

The dreaded Prussia was now ruled by a superstitious and voluptuous king, was exhausted in resources and divided in counsel. Prussia had, moreover, nothing to gain from an attack upon France. Her real enemy was Austria. So also he found reason to declare positively that none of the other countries, Austria, Sweden, the Germanic Confederation, Spain, Sardinia, would cause France any trouble. On the contrary, the despotic rulers feared the contagion of French liberty and would not risk contact with it through war. Their soldiers would certainly make comparisons and then, woe to tyranny!

The Jacobins were much impressed with this speech. They printed it and sent copies to their numerous affiliated societies, just as peace societies to-day print and circulate some of the speeches delivered at their sessions.

Nine months after the date of Brissot's speech France was at war with Austria. Four months after the declaration of war, that is, toward the close of August, 1791, Paris was in imminent danger of capture by the rapidly advancing Prussians and Austrians and was saved probably as much by the Duke of Brunswick's dislike of his task as by his inability to advance. It was the beginning of the great conflict extending over nearly a quarter of a century. And Brissot was arrogantly certain—spoke with the assurance and contempt of his opponents which characterize the pacifists of to-day—that Europe was not able to make war!

Even at the close of February, 1791, Pitt, the able English minister, declared officially that the prospect for continued peace in Europe was unusually good.

I said at the beginning that modern pacifism is a by-product of social democracy. It is not an essential part of its dogma. The radical wing of the revolution adopted it, not from a sincere moral conviction, but from considerations of party advantage. So, also, the European socialists of to-day are anti-militarists, not because they are more squeamish about the use of force than are mankind generally, but because the army seems to stand in the way of their aspirations as a party. Their failure to live up to their avowed principles when the present war broke out was, therefore, not an accident. There was no real conviction to overbalance the motives which urged them into the war. Their international fraternalism was based on party interest not on a genuine brotherly feeling. The origin of the party, its history from the time of the revolution to the present, should have warned the pacifists of America who stand outside of the party that their hope of peace enforced by European socialism rested upon an extremely fragile base, or rather upon a false assumption.

The same spurious pacifism is noticeable among the socialists and labour parties in the United States. Men who will not gag at the work of the dynamiter and the midnight assassin take umbrage at the existence of the national guards because these guards stand as the only effective barrier against the lawlessness of striking workmen. And the doctrinaire pacifists, in need of support, place themselves behind these incendiaries in demanding the abolition of the guards. The whole is done in the name of "anti-militarism." What the movement really stands for, in a practical sense, is anarchy. This, too, is not strange, for the socialists and anarchists of Europe were at one time gathered in the same fold, so near were their principles alike. It was not until after a prolonged parliamentary struggle and a formal vote that the anarchists were excluded from the ranks of the socialists.

It is at this point that we discover the cardinal weakness of the pacifists' position. Their ground is tenable only under the assumption that mankind desire justice and will live up to its requirements without compulsion. International morality always has been and still is notoriously below that of the average individual. A crowd will commit acts its component members would be ashamed to commit as individuals. But even the best individuals are far from voluntary subjection to the principles of justice. Our courts are crowded with litigants and it is an accepted fact that the losers usually submit only because the

force of society stands back of the court's decree. Evasion is practised wherever possible. Justice is not a thing which acts automatically. It must be enforced wherever interests clash. Municipal law is a law of force both in actual practice and in historical development, and the pacifist who seeks to extend its machinery and procedure to the domain of international relations simply ignores this fact. The Hague conferences have shown that it is an easy matter to establish an international court and to legislate upon international objects. But the war shows that such a court and such legislation are absolutely worthless. More, even. The advanced principles advocated at these conferences, having been disregarded by various belligerents, have themselves become the basis of violent recriminations which at this moment threaten to lead to deplorable reprisals. In trying to crowd our international legislation beyond the natural or moral standard we are suffering the same set-back experienced whenever the municipal legislator passes too far beyond the demands of his community. Such impatience does not make for peace and quiet progress. It leads to lawlessness, to contempt for law, back to anarchy, to violence. It is, therefore, possible that Mr. Roosevelt is right in thinking that the net result of the pacifist movement will be international friction rather than peace. The rules of international intercourse, imperfect as they are, are nevertheless precious. They did not spring, a completed code, from the brain of some doctrinarian, but were hammered out through ages of conflict. They do not embody the highest moral concepts the philosopher has reached in the seclusion of his study. On the contrary, they smell of the earth; they reek with the sweat and the blood of the multitudes who have contributed toward their establishment; they are human and therefore serviceable. Before, at the behest of pacifism, we cast them aside as worthless junk, it is worth while to ask pacifism itself for reasonable guarantees. For pacifism does not mean reform. It means revolution.

Pacifism is at present seeking to exchange its French dress for one of Anglo-Saxon cut. Instead of world federation through the emotions, through fraternal sentiments, more stress is now being laid upon what they are pleased to call "common interests." This phrase is impressive only so long as we are not disposed to become analytical. For what are "common interests"? Is not an interest, from its very nature a separatist, or exclusive, thing?

Two or more parties may be interested in the same object, but in that case their interests will be parallel or rival rather than common, and more likely to furnish a basis for war than for peace. It is just such a situation which is at present at the bottom of the trouble between England and Germany. The common objects are world trade and colonial empire. As a matter of fact it is difficult to imagine why nations should fight each other except for these common interests, whether material or otherwise. We have been often assured that the intellectual and artistic interests would never again permit the people of Europe to engage in mutual slaughter. In this field, it was said, no national boundaries existed. We find instead that the European scholars are more bellicose, if anything, than the men in the trenches. Nor does either art or education receive much respect at the hands of the contending forces. The cathedral of Rheims, with its peculiar interest to artists and architects, receives rather more than its share of German shells, and the university of Louvain is said to be largely a heap of ashes. In both cases the destruction appears as unprovoked and deliberate, showing that Germany does not regard art in France or education in Belgium as of much interest to her.

On the whole, these "common interests," material, intellectual, and artistic, began their rapid growth with the Renaissance and the age of discovery. The same period saw the rise of the national state into full consciousness and was marked by a series of great wars and national rivalries.

The final goal of pacifism seems to be a federated and unarmed world kept in submission by a federal police force. Those who advocate this scheme thus voluntarily surrender their case on the question of force *versus* justice, since their ultimate appeal is to force. They have come to the sane conclusion that justice receives no consideration anywhere unless she comes with a policeman at her back. As to how this federation is to be effected we are not told, as far as I am aware, and I cannot here go into the endless difficulties such a scheme would seem destined to encounter. But supposing it to have been put into operation, are we certain that the gain would overbalance the loss? Would it not almost of necessity lead to the end of free institutions and local self-government? Would it not mark the complete surrender of the Anglo-Saxon idea to the Latin principle of centralization? For, be it observed, this international police force is

designed for the express purpose of crushing nationalism. It would not stand in the same relation to the national states that our regular army stands toward the States of the Union. The founders of our government were careful to leave weapons in the hands of the people so that tyranny should never find them helpless. Our regular army is not designed as an instrument so obviously overwhelming as to make resistance hopeless even to men rendered desperate by oppression. The Anglo-Saxon people have always been leaders in freedom, the champions of free institutions. At the bottom of their creed lies the belief that oppression is sure to follow the opportunity for exercising it. That opportunity, we are now told, must be given to an international police force. For, unless this force is made so powerful as to inspire abject fear, it cannot, of course, fulfil its purpose of preventing war. Its commander will be master of the world and trample it under foot, if he so chooses. His army of millions of men must be composed of mercenaries who have emancipated themselves from the old-fashioned weakness of patriotism or they could not be depended on to serve where their sympathies should be involved. Imperial Rome at one time seemed to threaten the world with the stagnation which necessarily follows the suppression of healthy rivalry and the curbing of individualistic tendencies due to racial characteristics and local conditions. But the Rome of the Cæsars could not disarm the world; and Germany, whose ambitions we suspect to-day, is not likely to succeed where Rome failed under the more favourable conditions seventeen or eighteen hundred years ago. And if we dread the universal empire of Germany as long as we possess our weapons, what shall we not fear when we have given them into the hands of a colossal mercenary force which owes no allegiance except to the man who commands it? And we must make this step irrevocable, we are told. There must be no arms-factories except those in control of this army. After we take this plunge there is no returning. We shall no longer have the power to fight for our convictions, to refuse to do that against which our conscience rebels. For the sake of outward peace, for the sake of mere existence, we surrender all our higher moral and spiritual aspirations. If this is the price of peace, as it seems to me to be if we accept the pacifists' prescription, are we resigned to paying it?

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